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11 Introduction
Reset price in￿ ation is the rate of change of all desired prices. This measure of
in￿ ation is unobservable in the data. Recent work by Bils et al. (forthcoming)
(BKM) attempt to construct an empirical index of reset prices between 1990
and 2009, using the micro data on prices collected by the US Bureau of
Labour Statistics for the CPI. The dataset covers about 70% of the CPI.
This is the same database as Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) used, only updated
by more recent years. They then evaluated whether the existing Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models can explain the constructed
reset price in￿ ation. This measure of in￿ ation allows us to evaluate how
far the existing models are consistent with the ￿rm-level data. The issue is
important since, as shown by Levin, L￿pez-Salido, Nelson and Yun (2008)
and Kara (2010), micro-evidence on ￿rm behaviour can signi￿cantly a⁄ect
policy conclusions that arise from a model.
To construct this measure, the authors, for each month, divide items into
two categories: those that change price and those that do not. For those
that change price, the reset price is simply the current price. For those that
do not change price, the reset price is updated according to the rate of reset
in￿ ation among price changers in the current period. The updated prices are
the reset prices for those that do not change price. The reset price in the
economy is the weighted average of all reset prices. This in￿ ation index is
similar to the in￿ ation index constructed by Shiller (1991) for house prices.
2This measure might be best understood with an example, which is similar to
the example provided by the authors. Consider an economy with two goods,
each with an equal share: A and B. Assume that Good A￿ s price increases by
20% in period t, whereas Good B￿ s price remains unchanged. Assume further
that both goods have changed price in period t ￿ 1. The reset in￿ ation for
Good A in period t is simply 20%. Aggregate in￿ ation in the economy is
10%. Now consider the case in which in period t+1 Good B￿ s price increases
by 20%, whereas Good A￿ s price remain unchanged. The reset in￿ ation for
Good B is zero, since the increase in Good A￿ s price in period t also increases
the base price for calculating reset in￿ ation for Good B by 20%. Thus, reset
in￿ ation for both Goods A and B in period t + 1 is zero, whereas aggregate
in￿ ation is again 10%.
BKM employ a version of the popular Smets and Wouters (2007) model
to examine whether or not the model is consistent with the data on reset
in￿ ation. Speci￿cally, BKM assume that ￿rms set their prices according the
Calvo process, in which prices are set for a random duration1. They ￿nd
that this model cannot explain the observed reset price in￿ ation. Reset price
in￿ ation is more persistent than the data suggest. Based on this ￿nding, they
conclude that DSGE models are inconsistent with the data on reset in￿ ation.
1Smets and Wouters (2007) assume the Calvo model with indexation (IC). In this
model, the initial price is set according to the Calvo model but the price is updated
with recent in￿ ation. In this model, even though there is a price plan or a contract,
the price changes each period during the contract length. This implication of the model
is inconsistent with the micro-evidence provided by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Given this concern, BKM remove the indexation and
consider the Calvo model.
3This paper presents a DSGE model that explains the data on reset price
in￿ ation perfectly well. This is true even though the model exhibits substan-
tial strategic complementarity. I employ a model that has a more realistic
contract structure than the Calvo model employed by the BKM. Speci￿cally,
I employ a Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE), in which there are many
sectors, each with a Taylor-style contract, as in Dixon and Kara (2010a),
Dixon and Kara (2010b) and Kara (2010). The model can account for the
heterogeneity in contract lengths we have observed in the data (see e.g. Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)). The Calvo and GTE
models di⁄er in their price setting and in their underlying distribution of
contracts. The price setting in the GTE is more myopic than in the Calvo
model. Also, the Calvo model underestimates the share of ￿ exible prices.
I also compare the BKM measure of reset in￿ ation in the models with
the theoretical ideal. I ￿nd that in the GTE, the constructed reset in￿ ation
shows a very similar pattern to the theoretical ideal. However, this is not
true in the Calvo model. In sharp contrast to the ￿ndings reported in BKM,
the Calvo model itself does not necessarily suggest that reset in￿ ation should
adjust sluggishly. The theoretical reset in￿ ation in the model is similar to
that in the GTE. This ￿nding suggests that the BKM measure is not a robust
measure of the change in desired prices.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 presents evidence on reset price in￿ ation. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
42 The Model
The model is the GTE framework of Dixon and Kara (2010a). In this other-
wise standard DSGE model, there can be many sectors, each with a di⁄erent
contract length. When all the contracts have the same duration in the econ-
omy, the model reduces to a standard Taylor model. An advantage of the
GTE approach is that it is general enough to represent any distribution of
contract lengths, including those generated by the Calvo model. The Calvo
model is di⁄erent from the GTE because the price setters do not know how
long the contract will last: each period a fraction ! of ￿rms/households cho-
sen randomly starts a new contract. However, the Calvo process can be
described in deterministic terms at the aggregate level because the ￿rm-level
randomness washes out. As shown in Dixon and Kara (2006), the distribu-
tion of contract lengths across ￿rms is given by ￿i = !2i(1￿!)i￿1 : i = 1:::1,
with mean contract length T = 2!￿1 ￿ 1. The model here di⁄ers from the
one in Dixon and Kara (2010a), which assumes that wages are sticky whereas
goods prices are ￿ exible. Herein I assume that wages are ￿ exible whereas
goods prices are sticky.
2.1 Structure of the Economy
As in a standard DSGE model, in the model economy, there is a continuum
of ￿rms f 2 [0;1]. Corresponding to the continuum of ￿rms f, there is a
unit interval of household-unions (h 2 [0;1]). Each ￿rm is then matched with
5a ￿rm-speci￿c union(f = h) 2. The unit interval is divided into N sectors,
indexed by i = 1:::N. The share of each sector is given by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i =
1: Within each sector i, there is a Taylor process. Thus, there are i equally
sized cohorts j = 1:::i of unions and ￿rms. Each cohort sets the price which
lasts for Ti periods: one cohort moves each period. The share of each cohort
j within the sector i is given by ￿ij = 1
Ti where
PTi
j=1 ￿ij = 1. The longest
contracts in the economy are N periods.
A typical ￿rm produces a single di⁄erentiated good and operates a tech-
nology that transforms labour into output subject to productivity shocks.
The ￿nal consumption good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregate over the di⁄erentiated intermediate goods. Note that the assump-
tion of CES technology means that the demand for a ￿rm￿ s output (yft)
depends on the general of price(pt), its own price (pft) and the output level
(yft) : yft = ￿(pt ￿ pft) + yt; where ￿ measures the elasticity of substitution
between goods. Thus, the only commonality within a sector is that all ￿rms
in the same sector have the same contract length. The other elements of the
model are standard New Keynesian. The representative household derives
utility from consumption and leisure. The government conducts monetary
policy according to a Taylor rule.
2This assumption means that there is a ￿rm- speci￿c labour market. The implications
of this assumption for in￿ ation dynamics are well known (see, for example Edge (2002)
and Woodford (2003)).
62.2 Log-linearized Economy
In this section, I will simply present the log-linearized macroeconomic frame-
work.3 Before de￿ning the optimal price setting rule in the GTE, it is useful
to de￿ne the optimal price that would occur if price were perfectly ￿ exible
(￿ pit) (i.e. "the optimal ￿ ex price"). The log-linearized version of the optimal
￿ ex price in each sector is given by
￿ pit = pt + ￿yt ￿ ￿at (1)












Where ￿cc = ￿UccC




the inverse of the labor elasticity and ￿ is the sectoral elasticity: at denotes
productivity shocks, which follows an AR(1) process: at = ￿at￿1+"t; where "t
is an idd(0;￿2
a): The optimal ￿ ex prices will, in general, di⁄er across sectors,
since the sectors are hit by di⁄erent shocks.
We can represent the price-setting behaviour in the GTE in terms of
three general equations: one for the optimal price in sector i (xit), one for
the average price in sector i (pit) and one for the average price in the economy
3A technical appendix at the end of the paper provide a detailed discussion of the














where ￿ij = 1
i. The optimal price (3) in sector i is simply the average
(expected) optimal ￿ ex price over the contract length (the nominal price is
constant over the contract length). The optimal prices will, in general, di⁄er
across sectors, since they take the average over a di⁄erent time horizon. The
average price in sector i (4) is related to the past optimal prices in that sector.
The average price in the economy (5) is simply the weighted average of all
ongoing sectoral prices.
These equations (3 - 5) can represent the Calvo economy. To obtain the
simple Calvo economy from (3), the summation is made with Ti = 1 and
￿ij = !(1 ￿ !)j￿1 : j = 1:::1; where ! is the Calvo hazard rate:
The output level in the economy is given by the standard Euler condition:
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
cc (rt ￿ Et￿t+1) (6)
where ￿t = pt ￿ pt￿1 is the in￿ ation rate and rt is the nominal interest
rate.
8Following Taylor and Wieland (2008), the central bank follows a Taylor
style rule under which the short term interest rate is adjusted to respond to
the in￿ ation rate and the current and lagged output levels:
rt = ￿￿￿t + ￿y(yt ￿ yt￿1) + ￿t (7)
where ￿t is a monetary policy shock and follows a white noise process with
zero mean and a ￿nite variance.






￿i￿ij (xit ￿ xit￿1) (8)
~ ￿t is the theoretical reset price in￿ ation and is di⁄erent from the BKM
measure of reset in￿ ation. When constructing their empirical measure of reset
in￿ ation, BKM assume that ￿rms that do not change price in the current
period update their reset prices according to the average reset in￿ ation for
price changers. Thus, the constructed reset price in sector i (p￿






























it￿1 is the sectoral constructed reset in￿ ation.
2.3 Choice of Parameters
The time period of calibration is bi-monthly. I use the KK dataset to cali-
brate a GTE. The data are derived from the US Consumer Price Index data
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The period covered is 1988-2005,
and about 300 categories account for about 70% of the CPI. The dataset pro-
vides the average proportion of prices changing per month for each category.
I interpret these statistics as Calvo reset probabilities. I then generate the
distribution of durations for that category using the formula put forward by
Dixon and Kara (2006). I sum all sectors using the category weights. The
distribution in terms of months is plotted in Figure 1. The mean contract
length is around 15 months. There is a long tail. However, the most com-
mon contract duration is one month. I then aggregate monthly data to a
bimonthly level. For computational purposes, the distribution is truncated
at N = 30, with the 30-period contracts absorbing all of the weights from
the longer contracts. Following the literature, (e.g. Dixon and Kara (2010a),
Walsh (2005) and Woodford (2003)), I set ￿
LL = 4:5; ￿
CC = 1 and ￿ = 6. I
set ￿ = 0:8 and ￿a = 4:10%; in line with BKM4 I set ￿￿ = 0:75; ￿￿ = 1:1
and ￿y = 0:5; in line with Taylor (1999). Following BKM, I set the standard
deviation of monetary policy shocks to 0:48%. In the Calvo model, I set
4In the working paper version of the paper see Bils, Klenow and Malin (2009)), BKM
calibrate the standard deviations of idiosyncratic productivity shocks in their menu cost
model at around 5%.
10! to ! = 0:25 so that the mean contract length in the two models are the
same.
3 Evidence on Reset Price In￿ ation
Table 1 reports summary statistics on BKM￿ s empirical measure of reset
in￿ ation as well aggregate in￿ ation. The ￿rst row of Table 1 reports the
persistence of reset in￿ ation. The persistence of these series is measured by
the ￿rst-order autocorrelation. As the table shows, there is no persistence
in reset in￿ ation. The serial correlation is almost zero. Aggregate in￿ ation
is more persistent than reset in￿ ation. The third row of Table 1 reports
the persistence of aggregate in￿ ation. The serial correlation of aggregate
in￿ ation is around 0.27. The table further indicates that aggregate in￿ ation
is less volatile than reset in￿ ation. The standard deviation of reset in￿ ation is
around 0.69%, whereas the standard deviation of aggregate in￿ ation is 0.52%.
These numbers imply that the ration between the standard deviations of reset
in￿ ation and the standard deviations of in￿ ation is around 1.3.
All goods
Standard deviation of ￿￿ (￿￿￿) 0:69%
Serial correlation of ￿￿ ￿0:03
Standard deviation of ￿ (￿￿￿) 0:52%
Serial correlation of ￿ 0:27
￿￿￿=￿￿ 1:32
Table 1: Summary Statistics for monthly Reset and Aggregate Price In￿ ation
(source: BKM)
11Note that, in addition to aggregate statistics, BKM also report statistics
for two subgroups: ￿ exible goods and sticky goods. However, this catego-
rization is misleading, since the ￿ exible goods group does not consist only
of goods that adjust their prices every period. BKM report that the mean
frequency of price changes in this group is 0.33. If within each group there
is a Calvo process, then in the ￿ exible group there are plenty of contracts
longer than 1-period. Recall the distribution of contracts in the Calvo model
is given by the following formula: ￿i = !2i(1 ￿ !)i￿1 : i = 1:::1; where
￿i is the share of i-period contract in the economy. Therefore, the statistics
for the subgroups reported in BKM have limited value. I do not report and
discuss those statistics here.
4 Results
Having reviewed the stylised features we can ask the following question: can
a DSGE model that accounts for the heterogeneity in contracts lengths ex-
plain these features? Table 3 provides an answer to this question. There, I
report summary statistics for the GTE based on the Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) dataset (hereafter, KK-GTE) 5.
5All calculations are performed using Dynare version 4.2 (see Juillard (1996)).
12All goods
Standard deviation of ￿￿ (￿￿￿) 0:69%
Serial correlation of ￿￿ ￿0:03
Standard deviation of ￿ (￿￿￿) 0:41%
Serial correlation of ￿ 0:29
Standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:4%
Serial correlation of ~ ￿ ￿0:04
￿￿￿=￿￿ 1:68
Table 2: Summary Statistics for bi-monthly Reset and Aggregate Price In-
￿ ation
As the table shows, the standard deviation and serial correlation of reset
in￿ ation match the empirical statistics. The model also closely aligns with
aggregate in￿ ation data. The serial correlation of aggregate in￿ ation in the
model is 0:29%, whereas it is 0:27% in the data. The standard deviation of
aggregate in￿ ation in the model is 0:41%, whereas it is 0:52% in the data.
At around 1:68, the ratio of the standard deviations for reset versus actual
in￿ ation is in-line with what the data suggests. In the data, this ratio is 1:32.
Figure 2 plots the impulse response functions (IRFs) for reset price and
aggregate in￿ ation to the productivity shock in the model6. The initial re-
sponses are normalized to one. The model IRFs are in line with the empiri-
cal IRF reported in BKM. Prices adjust gradually and go back to the initial
steady state after some time of the shock. Aggregate price is more persistent
than reset price because it includes many prices that are ￿xed.
6The standard deviations of monetary policy shocks are small relative to the standard
deviations of productivity shocks. Thus, the presence of monetary policy shocks in the
model does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect conclusions. This is true for all the experiments reported
in the paper.
13These results suggest that the model does a remarkable job of account-
ing for the observed persistence and volatility of both reset in￿ ation and
aggregate in￿ ation. It is important to note that the model exhibits strategic
complementarity among ￿rms. BKM argue that a model with strong strate-
gic complementarities cannot match the data. In this model, ￿ is a measure
of the degree of strategic complementarity of ￿rm pricing decisions (see equa-
tion 2). If ￿ < 1, then the model exhibits strategic complementarities. If
￿ > 1, then in the model ￿rm decisions are strategic substitutes. My cali-
brated value of ￿ = 0:2 implies a large degree of strategic complementarity.
The table also reports the standard deviation and the persistence of ~ ￿t:
~ ￿t is the theoretical reset price in￿ ation. It is unobservable in the data but
is observable in the model. It is important to examine to see if ~ ￿t follows a
similar pattern as ￿￿
t: ￿￿
t may not be a good measure of ~ ￿t. Given that the
KK-GTE ￿ts many of the facts in BKM aim to match, I can safely use it
to compare ~ ￿t and ￿￿
t. As the table shows, the statistics for ~ ￿t are similar
to those for ￿￿
t: Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the
constructed reset price in￿ ation and the theoretical one to the productivity
shock7. In the KK-GTE, ~ ￿t; indeed, follows a similar pattern as ￿￿
t.
What is the mechanism at work here? This is best illustrated by focusing
on the theoretical reset price in￿ ation. First, recall that following Taylor
7The standard deviations of monetary policy shocks are small relative to the standard
deviations of productivity shocks. Thus, the presence of monetary policy shocks in the
model does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect conclusions. This is true for all the experiments reported
in this paper.
14and Wieland (2008), I assume that the central bank follows a Taylor style
rule under which the interest rate responds to changes in in￿ ation rate and
in the growth rate of the output. As discussed in Woodford (2003, p. 522-
527), such a policy is closely related to the price-level targeting (PLT), under
which the central bank reacts to changes in prices and output, as the Taylor
and Wieland (2008) rule is the ￿st di⁄erence of PLT. This policy closely
approximates the outcome under PLT. In fact, Gorodnichenko and Shapiro
(2007) argue that the Greenspan FED did price level targeting. Under such
a policy, the central bank aims to o⁄set the impact of the shock on the price
level. Consider a positive productivity shock that hits the economy at time
t. The productivity shock would lead to a decrease in reset price in￿ ation.
The central bank would try to push in￿ ation up, not only to its target but,
temporarily above its target. A period of below-target in￿ ation would have
to be matched by a period of above-target in￿ ation to get the price level
back on its targeting path. Figure 3 con￿rms this intuition. As the ￿gure
shows, reset price in￿ ation falls when the shock hits the economy. It becomes
positive after the second period. Hence, the persistence of it is almost zero.
Figure 4 plots the IRFs for aggregate in￿ ation to the productivity shock.
Aggregate in￿ ation is more persistent than reset price in￿ ation.
So, why do BKM argue that the general equilibrium models cannot ￿t
the empirical estimates reported in Table 1? To understand the di⁄erence
between our conclusions, I repeat the same experiments as in Table 2 but
replace the GTE assumption with the Calvo process, as in BKM. All the
15parameters are held at their baseline values. Table 3 reports the summary
statistics of reset in￿ ation and aggregate in￿ ation for BKM￿ s Calvo economy.
As the table shows and as BKM ￿nd, the constructed reset in￿ ation in the
BKM model is more persistent than in the data. The serial correlation of
reset in￿ ation in the model is ￿0:48, whereas it is -0:03 in the data. The
serial correlation of aggregate in￿ ation in the model is 0:68, whereas it is
0:27 in the data. Related to this result, aggregate in￿ ation is considerably
less volatile than in the data. The standard deviations of aggregate in￿ ation
is about one fourth of what it is in the data. The standard deviation of reset
price in￿ ation in the model is higher than in the data. It is 0:82% in the
model, whereas it is 0:69% in the data. Given these numbers, the model fails
the ratio of the standard deviations for reset versus actual in￿ ation test. This
ratio is 3:8 in the model, whereas it is only 1:32 in the data. These ￿ndings
are all in line with the ￿ndings reported in BKM.
All goods
Standard deviation of ￿￿ (￿￿￿) 0:82%
Serial correlation of ￿￿ ￿0:48
Standard deviation of ￿ (￿￿) 0:21%
Serial correlation of ￿ 0:68
Standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:21
Serial correlation of ~ ￿ ￿0:04
￿￿￿=￿￿ 3:84
Table 3: Summary Statistics for monthly Reset and Aggregate Price In￿ ation
from BKM￿ s 2-sector Calvo Model
If we focus on the statistics for ~ ￿; we see that, in contrast to the case
16with the GTE, in the Calvo model ~ ￿t is quite di⁄erent from ￿￿
t. The serial
correlation of ~ ￿t is -0.04, whereas it is -0.51 for ￿￿
t: There is also di⁄erence
in standard deviations, although the di⁄erence is not as great as in serial
correlations. The standard deviation of ~ ￿t is ￿0:68%, whereas it is ￿0:82%
for ￿￿
t. Figure 4 plots the IRFs for constructed reset in￿ ation and theoretical
in￿ ation for a productivity shock. Figure 4 con￿rms that the di⁄erence be-
tween the two measures of reset in￿ ation. It is interesting to note that ~ ￿t in
the Calvo model is similar to than in the KK-GTE. Thus, the Calvo model
itself does not suggest that the reset in￿ ation should adjust sluggishly.
Therefore, the conclusion that the Calvo model generates to much reset
price in￿ ation arises due to the way BKM measure reset in￿ ation. This
suggests that the BKM measure of reset in￿ ation is not a good measure of
the concept they want to measure and can be misleading.
A question arises: why ~ ￿ is very di⁄erent from ￿￿
t in the Calvo model.
To understand the reason for this result, ￿rst note that the KK-GTE di⁄ers
from the Calvo in two respects. First, the price setting in the GTE is more
myopic than in the Calvo model. Second, the underlying distribution of
contracts are di⁄erent. The ￿rst di⁄erence arises because of the fact that the
Calvo ￿rms do not know how long their contract will last, whereas in the
GTE they do. As a consequence, Calvo ￿rms have a probability distribution
over contract lengths. Since there is a positive probability of any duration
occurring, ￿rms when setting their prices need to look at far into the future.
The GTE ￿rms, on the other hand, since they know in which sector they
17belong and, therefore, how long is their contract, they only need look at
things that happen during the contract length. Thus, Calvo-￿rms are more
forward-looking than the GTE ￿rms8. The Calvo ￿rms that adjust their
prices in period t react more to the shock than the corresponding ￿rms in
the GTE. As a consequence, the Calvo economy experiences higher de￿ ation
than the GTE at time t when the productivity shock hit the economy. To
bring the current price level back to its starting point, the Calvo economy
will need to experience higher in￿ ation than the GTE in future periods.
Perhaps the importance of the di⁄erence in price-setting on reset prices
can be clearly shown by comparing the Calvo model with a special GTE that
has exactly the same distribution of contract lengths as the Calvo model (i.e
a Calvo-GTE). The distribution of contracts with the chosen parameter value
! = 0:25 is plotted in Figure 5. Thus, the sole di⁄erence between the two
models is the price setting. Figure 6 plots the impulse response function of
theoretical reset in￿ ation to a positive productivity shock in the Calvo model
and in the Calvo-GTE. As the ￿gure shows, in the Calvo ￿rms react more
to the shocks than the Calvo-GTE ￿rms and set a lower price than the GTE
￿rms. As a consequence, the Calvo economy experiences higher in￿ ation
than the corresponding GTE.
When constructing their measure of reset price in￿ ation, BKM assume
that those ￿rms that do not reset price update their prices according to the
rate of reset in￿ ation among price changers in the current period. This can
8This point is made in Dixon and Kara (2010a) and is emphasised in Dixon (2006).
18be clearly seen by considering the constructed reset price in￿ ation in the
Calvo model, given by
￿
￿
t = !~ ￿t + (1 ￿ !)(￿t￿1 + (~ ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t￿1)) (11)
As this equation makes clear, the large change in (~ ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t￿1) in the initial
period in the model leads to large discrepancy between the constructed reset
in￿ ation and the theoretical ideal.
However, as noted BKM, the Calvo model generates too much persistence
in aggregate in￿ ation. Furthermore, the Calvo model signi￿cantly underesti-
mates the share of ￿ exible contracts. The reason for this can be understood
by comparing Figures 1 and 4. In the KK-GTE, just as we observe in the
data, there is a high proportion of ￿ exible prices. The share of 1-month
contract is around 25% in the KK-GTE, where it is only 6% in the Calvo
model.
Finally, it is important to note that BKM focus on the period between
1990-2009. They note that when they consider longer samples, they ￿nd that
aggregate in￿ ation is more persistent. They suggest that the high degree of
persistence over longer samples might be due to monetary policy. The KK-
GTE con￿rms this suggestion. In Dixon and Kara (2010b), one ￿nds that,
with a di⁄erent monetary policy, the GTE can generate a very persistent
in￿ ation response, peaking at the 8th quarter and beyond. Thus, as in the
data, in the GTE the high persistence is not a structural feature of the
19economy and can change if monetary policy changes.
5 Conclusions
I have examined whether a GTE model that accounts for the heterogeneity
in contracts length can explain the data on both aggregate in￿ ation and
constructed reset in￿ ation. In this otherwise standard DSGE model, there
are many sectors, each with a Taylor style contract. I have shown that a
GTE calibrated based on the Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) dataset explain
both. The model incorporates strong complementarities.
These results contrast with the ￿ndings reported by BKM. These authors
argue that DSGE models with strong complementarities have trouble in ex-
plaining their measure reset price in￿ ation and aggregate in￿ ation. BKM
employ the popular Calvo model. They argue the model generates too much
persistence in reset price in￿ ation and aggregate in￿ ation. I show that the
conclusion that the Calvo model generates a degree of persistence stems from
the way BKM measure reset in￿ ation. In the Calvo model the theoretical
reset price in￿ ation is slightly more persistent than in the KK-GTE. The
reason for this di⁄erence is that the price setting in the Calvo model is more
forward-looking than in GTE. BKM￿ s constructed reset in￿ ation is updated
according to the growth theoretical reset price in￿ ation. Increased persis-
tence in reset in￿ ation in the Calvo model leads to a large di⁄erence between
the constructed reset in￿ ation and the theoretical ideal. Moreover, using the
20GTE approach, I am able to understand why the Calvo model generates too
much persistence in aggregate in￿ ation. The reason for this is that the Calvo
model underestimates the share of ￿ exible prices.
These ￿ndings clearly show the existing models strong complementarities
can readily account for the observed reset price in￿ ation. Reset price may
turn out to be a useful concept for monetary policy. I leave this issue as a
matter for future research
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246 Appendix: The Model
6.1 Firms
A typical ￿rm in the economy produces a di⁄erentiated good which requires
labour as the only input, with a CRS technology represented by
Yft = AtLft (12)
where at = log At is a productivity shock and follows an AR(1) process:
at = ￿at￿1+"t: f 2 [0;1] is ￿rm speci￿c index. Di⁄erentiated goods Yt(f) are
combined to produce a ￿nal consumption good Yt: The production function

























The ￿rm chooses fPft;Yft;Lftg to maximize pro￿ts subject to (12, 14),





























Price is a markup over marginal cost, which depends on the wage rate
(Wft) and the sector speci￿c productivity shocks.
6.2 Household-Unions






t [U(Cht) + V (1 ￿ Hht)]
#
(18)
where Cht, Hht are household h0s consumption and hours worked respectively,
t is an index for time, 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, and h 2 [0;1] is the
household speci￿c index.







t+1) ￿ Bht + WhtHht + ￿ht ￿ Tht (19)
where Bh(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(st+1 j st) at
26state st and pays o⁄ one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized. Bht
represents the value of the household￿ s existing claims given the realized
state of nature. Wht is the nominal wage, ￿ht is the pro￿ts distributed by
￿rms and WhtHht is the labour income. Finally, Tt is a lump-sum tax.




























Equation (20) is the Euler equation. Equation (21) gives the gross nominal
interest rate. Equation (22) shows that the optimal wage in sector i (Xit) is a
constant "mark-up" over the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure and marginal
utility from consumption. Note that the index h is dropped in equations
(20) and (22), which re￿ ects our assumption of complete contingent claims
markets for consumption and implies that consumption is identical across all
households in every period (Cht = Ct):
Using (15), aggregating for ￿rm f in sector i; substituting out for Wit in
the resulting equation using the optimal labour supply condition (22), using
27the labour demand function (17) to substitute out for Lit and log-linearizing
the resulting equation, I obtain the price level when prices are full ￿ exible
p
￿










Note that the optimal ￿ ex price in each sector is the same.






Figure 1: KK-distribution: the distribution of completed contract lengths
(in months)










Figure 2: Response of constructed Reset Price to a productivity shock in the
KK-GTE (percent deviation from the steady state)










Constructed Reset Price Inflation
Theoretical Reset Price Inflation
Figure 3: Responses of Constructed Reset Price In￿ ation and theoretical Re-
set Price in￿ ation to a productivity shock in the KK-GTE (percent deviation
from the steady state)











Figure 4: Responses of Constructed Reset Price In￿ ation and theoretical
Reset Price in￿ ation to a productivity shock in the Calvo model (percent
deviation from the steady state)








Figure 5: Distributiuon of Completed Contract Lengths in the Calvo model
(in months)









Figure 6: Responses of Theoretical Reset In￿ ation to a productivity shock in
the Calvo model and In the Calvo-GTE (percent deviation from the steady
state)
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